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On the one hand the high price of oil is a unique opportunity for African oil producers to use the 
windfall gains to speed up their development. On the other hand, it is having adverse effects on 
net-oil importing countries, in particular those which cannot access international capital markets 
to smooth out the shock. We construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, which is 
tailored to reflect the characteristics of African economies, to quantify the effect of the increase 
in the price of oil on the main macro economic aggregates. The model is general enough that it 
imbeds both oil producing and oil importing countries. Our results indicate that a doubling of the 
price of oil on world markets with complete pass through to oil consumers would lead to a 6 per 
cent contraction of the median net-oil importing African country in the first year. If that country 
were  to  adopt  a  no-pass  through  strategy,  output  would  not  be  significantly  affected  but  its 
budget deficit would increase by 6 per cent. As for the median net oil exporting country, a 
doubling in the price of oil would mean that its gross domestic product would increase by 4 
percent under managed-float and by 9 percent under a fixed exchange rate regime. However, 
inflation would increase by a much greater magnitude under managed than a fixed exchange rate 
regime in a median net oil exporting country.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
While a barrel of crude oil was trading between $18 and $23 in the 1990s it crossed the $40 mark 
in 2004 and traded at around $60 from 2005. During the summer and fall of 2007, the price of 
one barrel of crude oil jumped above the $70 mark and even reached $80. Although, in real 
terms, the price of oil is still lower than in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the recent upsurge can 
have dramatic consequences on oil-importing countries. The impact of high oil prices is likely to 
be even more severe in countries that are overly dependent on oil and/or have limited access to 
international capital markets. This description characterizes many African economies.   
Net-oil importing countries have explored a number of policy options to cushion their economies 
from the adverse impact of the high price of oil. In 2006 the African Development Bank (AfDB) 
implemented a survey to investigate the extent to which governments of its Regional Member 
Countries (RMCs) have intervened on the retail market for fuel to limit the pass-through of 
international oil prices. Out of the 24 RMCs on which we have data, 20 had legislation in place 
to control the retail price of gasoline and only 4 had full pass-through. As a result, while the price 
of oil had nearly doubled between 2000 and 2005, domestic prices have increased at a much 
slower pace. For example, the price of regular gas increased by 65 percent in Benin, 76 percent 
in Mali and 77 per cent in Mauritius. Interestingly, the retail price of price was even inversely 
correlated with the world price of crude oil for some period (e.g. Mauritius). Moreover, the 
survey indicates that governments subsidize, or limit the pass through of, kerosene more than 
other types of fuel on the grounds that it is consumed by the poor.  
Further evidence of government intervention in the fuel market is provided by a 2006 World 
Bank survey conducted in 36 developing countries. 14 were found to have suspended market-
based pricing to avoid full pass through of the world price of oil to domestic customers (ESMAP, 
2006). In addition, 12 others were already controlling fuel prices which meant that they were 
pricing fuel below the true international market equivalent.  More recently, Baig et. al. (2007) 
find that only half of 44 developing and emerging market countries have fully passed-through the 
increase in international fuel prices to consumers between 2003 and 2006. 
As for oil-exporting countries, they stand to benefit from the significant influx of foreign revenue 
which they could harness for their development. They are challenged to manage the oil windfalls   4 
for  the  benefit  of  the  whole  population,  as  well  as  future  generations,  and  cushion  their 
economies against any Dutch disease. However, the benefits of the high price of oil are not 
evenly spread across Africa. The 5 top oil-producing countries (Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, Angola 
and Egypt) account for more than 80 per cent of the continent’s production. At approximately 
$60 dollars per barrel of oil, the average present value of oil reserves is $33,000 for each resident 
of an oil-producing African country. Oil-producing countries with small population, which in 
addition are currently quite poor, stand to benefit substantially on a per capita basis. While oil-
exporting countries obviously benefit from high oil prices, economies that are heavily reliant on 
oil exports can become vulnerable to the Dutch disease. Again, this is the case of most African 
oil-exporting countries. 
 
While there is a large literature on the macroeconomic effects of oil-price shocks, most are based 
on vector autoregression (VAR) models (see for example Hamilton (1996) and Bernanke, Gertler 
and Watson (1997)). Although these models are useful to characterize the statistical relationships 
between economic variables and to establish relevant stylized facts, they lack economic content 
and do not reveal mechanisms through which shocks propagate. In addition, the reduced-form 
nature of VAR models renders them subject to the Lucas critique.  To the best of our knowledge, 
only a handful of studies analyze the effects of oil-price shocks within a dynamic stochastic 
general  equilibrium  (DSGE)  framework.  Notable  examples  are  Rotemberg  and  Woodford 
(1996),  Backus  and  Crucini  (2000),  Leduc  and  Sill  (2004),  and  Medina  and  Soto  (2005). 
Moreover, none of these earlier papers is concerned with effects of oil prices or is specific to the 
context of African economies. 
This paper departs from the existing literature by using a DSGE model to study the quantitative 
effects of oil-price shocks on oil-importing and oil-exporting African economies. Our model 
belongs to the class of new open-economy macroeconomic models, which have become the main 
tool used in modern international macroeconomics. The model developed in this paper is more 
general than these earlier ones and is better suited for the African economies. Our model is one 
of a small open economy that shares some features with the models developed by Kollmann 
(2001), Bergin (2003), and Bouakez and Rebei (2005).  
Our results indicate that a doubling in the world price of oil can lead to an important loss in 
output and consumption and to higher inflation in oil-importing countries, especially if these   5 
countries operate under a fixed exchange rate regime. The adverse effect on output, however, can 
be mitigated through government intervention or through foreign aid.  More specifically, our 
results indicate that a doubling of the price of oil with complete pass through would lead to a 6 
per cent contraction of the median net-oil importing African country in the first year. If that 
country were to adopt a no-pass through strategy, output would not be significantly affected but 
its budget deficit would increase by 6 per cent. As for the median net oil exporting country, a 
doubling in the price of oil would mean that its gross domestic product would increase by 4 
percent under managed-float and by 9 percent under a fixed exchange rate regime. However, 
under  inflation  would  increase  by  a  much  greater  magnitude  under  managed  than  a  fixed 
exchange rate regime in a median net oil exporting country.  
 
Government intervention limits the degree of pass-through from the world price of oil, which 
shields the economy from higher input costs. To the extent that the government relies mostly on 
public debt to finance its expenditures, this policy will translate into a higher budget deficit and a 
larger consumption loss. As for foreign aid, the model predicts that the amounts needed to offset 
the output loss associated with higher oil prices are fairly small. In oil-exporting countries, a 
doubling in the world price of oil generates a sizable increase in output and consumption. The 
effect on inflation depends on which exchange rate regime is in effect. The expansionary effects 
of oil-price shocks are accompanied by a sharp appreciation of the real exchange rate, which can 
be harmful if the economy is heavily concentrated in a few industries. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 
describes the main results regarding the effects of an oil-price shock. Section 4 discusses the 
policy implications of these results. Section 5 concludes and discusses possible future extensions 
of the model.   6 
 
2.  Literature Review 
There are few studies that analyze the effects of oil-price shocks for African countries. Ayadi, 
Chatterjee and Obi (2000) study the effects of  oil production shocks in Nigeria. A standard 
Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) process including oil production, oil exports, the real exchange 
rate, money supply, net foreign assets, interest rate, inflation, and output is estimated over the 
1975-1992 period. Empirically, the response of output is positive after a positive oil production 
shock. Moreover, the impact response of output is less than one fifth of that of oil production, but 
the response of output after a year is slightly larger than that of oil production. The response of 
inflation is negative after a positive oil production shock. The impact response of inflation is 
negligible relative to that of oil production, but the response of inflation after a year is more than 
two times larger than that of oil production. The response of the real exchange rate is generally 
positive after a positive oil production shock, indicating a real depreciation of the Naira. The 
impact response of the real exchange rate is negligible relative to that of oil production, but the 
response  of  the  real  exchange  rate  after  a  year  is  around  two  times  larger  than  that  of  oil 
production.  To  the  extent  that  an  oil  price  increase  leads  to  an  oil  production  increase,  the 
responses suggest that output increases, inflation decreases, and the national currency depreciates 
following a positive oil-price shock. 
Ayadi (2005) uses a standard VAR process to analyze directly the effects of oil-price shocks for 
Nigeria over the 1980-2004 period. This VAR process includes the same set of variables as in 
Ayadi,  Chatterjee  and  Obi  (2000),  except  that  the  oil  production  variable  is  replaced  by  oil 
prices. Unfortunately, the responses of the macroeconomic variables to an oil-price shock are not 
reported. Nevertheless, it is likely that the responses of output, inflation, and the real exchange 
rate are small following an oil price shock. This can be deduced from the small contributions of 
the oil price shock to the variance decompositions of output, inflation, and the real exchange rate. 
More precisely, the contributions of the oil price shock to the variance of output are 1 percent at 
impact and about 7 percent after a year. The contributions of the oil price shock to the variance 
of inflation are less than 1 percent at impact and after a year. The contributions of the oil price 
shock to the variance of the real exchange rate are 0 percent at impact and 5 percent after a year. 
In  comparison, the contributions of the oil-price shock to the variance of oil prices are 100 
percent at impact and about 97 percent after a year.   7 
Finally,  Semboja  (1994)  studies  the  effects  of  oil  price  changes  for  Kenya,  which  is  a  net 
importer of oil. For this purpose, he calibrates a static computable general equilibrium model to 
obtain  the  impact  responses,  rather  than  estimating  a  VAR  process  to  generate  the  dynamic 
responses. The impact responses suggest that an increase in oil prices lead to an increase of the 
trade balance, a decrease of output and of the price index, and a deterioration of the terms of 
trade.  
 
More  recently,  international  financial  institutions  and  development  banks  have  produced 
estimates of the impact of high oil prices on the world and regional economies. IMF estimates 
indicate  that  highly-indebted  oil-intensive  and  fragile  sub-Saharan  African  countries  would 
suffer the most from higher oil prices. According to its estimates, they would lose more than 3 
percent of their GDP following a $5 increase in the price of crude oil (International Energy 
Agency, 2004).
* The World Bank, using the MULTIMOD model, estimates that a $10 increase 
in the price of oil, from a baseline of $23/bbl, would mean that net-oil importing countries with 
per capita income below US$ 300 for 1999-2001 would lose 1.47 percent of their GDP. Some of 
the lowest income countries would be even worse off losing 4 percent of their GDP (ESMAP, 
2005 and UNDP/ESMAP, 2005). Were oil prices to increase by US$20 then the effect on GDP 
would be doubled. 
 
These estimates are however subject to a number of limitations. The World Bank estimate is 
based on the ratio of the net oil and oil products imports to GDP assuming there is a zero price 
elasticity of demand for oil and oil products. Under this assumption, following a rise in the oil 
price, GDP changes by as much as the change in the value of net imports. This linear relation is 
simple but, as recognized by the authors themselves, is limited (UNDP/ESMAP, 2005). First, it 
assumes no microeconomic adjustments to the oil shocks, and that the response is entirely by a 
reduction in oil absorption. Second, economies gradually adjust to large changes and this can 
offset some of the severity of the initial oil shock.  
 
A few papers have explored the distributional impact of an increase in the price of oil. Nicholson 
et al. (2003) find that a 100 percent increase of oil prices lead to 2 percent increase of the average 
household’s expenditure in Mozambique. Coady and Newhouse (2005) using data from Ghana 
                                                       
* The countries which fall into this group is not given.   8 
report that a 20 percent increase in average oil prices leads to 3.4 percent fall in average real 
income. In Mali, Kpodar (2006) calculates that a 34 percent rise in the prices of all oil products 
lead reduces real income of the poorest by to 0.9 percent and the income of richest households by 
1 percent. 
 
3.  The Model 
 
3.1.    Overview of the Model 
The economy consists of households, firms, a government, and a monetary authority. There are 
four types of goods: a final good, a composite non-oil good, oil, and intermediate goods. The 
production sector of the economy is summarized in Figure 1. 
The final good, which serves consumption and investment purposes, is produced by perfectly 
competitive firms using oil and a non-oil composite good as inputs. The non-oil composite good 
is  produced  by  mixing  domestically  produced  and  imported  intermediate  goods.  Domestic 
intermediate goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms that use domestic labor 
and capital as inputs. Domestically produced intermediate goods are also exported to the rest of 
the world. Export prices are denominated in foreign currency (dollars). Foreign intermediate 
goods are imported by monopolistically competitive importers at the world price. These goods 
are then sold to local firms at domestic-currency prices. Prices set by monopolistic firms are 
costly to change, and are thus sticky. Price stickiness in import and export prices causes the law 
of one price to fail, and leads to movements in the real exchange rate. 
Oil used to produce the final good is either imported or locally produced, depending on 
wether the country is a net importer or a net exporter of oil. In oil-importing countries, the 
government  practices  local  currency  pricing  (LCP),  buying  oil  at  the  world  price, 
* o
t P ,  and 
reselling it to domestic firms at the domestic price 
o
t P , In oil-exporting countries, it is assumed 
that the oil industry is owned by the government, which sells oil to the rest of the world at the 
world price, 
* o
t P , and to domestic firms at the domestic price, 
o
t P .  These two prices need not be 
identical even after converting the world price to domestic currency. Depending on how the 
government sets
0
t P , pass-through from the world price to the local price of oil will be complete   9 
or incomplete. In the model, the government follows a rule that can yield any degree of pass-
through from zero to 100%. 
The government finances its expenditures mostly by issuing public debt. On the other hand, 
access  to  international  financial  markets  can  be  limited,  depending  on  the  severity  of  credit 
constraints that a given country faces. Countries that have only limited access to international 
financial markets cannot buffer shocks and smooth consumption by resorting to international 
borrowing. This feature is captured in the model by assuming portfolio-adjustment costs that are 
quadratic in the stock of foreign debt. 
The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor-type rule, which is 
general enough to encompass practically all possible monetary-policy/exchange rate regimes. In 
particular, the rule nests fixed exchange rate regimes and managed floats, which characterize the 
vast majority of African economies. 
 
The  rest  of  this  section  provides  a  detailed  description  of  the  model,  derives  the  first-order 
conditions, and describes the equilibrium. Throughout the paper, variables that originate in the 
rest of the world are denoted by an asterisk, and variables that do not have a time subscript refer 
to steady-state values. 
 
3.2  Households 
 
The representative household maximizes its lifetime utility given by 
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where b is the subjective discount factor (0<b<1), u is the instantaneous utility function, ct is 
consumption, mt denotes real money balances held at the end of period t, and ht denotes hours 
worked by the household.
†  The instantaneous utility function is assumed to be  
 


















  (2) 
 
                                                       
†In each period, the household’s total endowment of time is normalized to unity.   10 
where mt=Mt/Pt, with Mt being the nominal money stock and Pt the price of the final good; and g, 
h and v are positive parameters. 
 
The representative household enters period t with Mt-1 units of domestic money, Bt-1 government 
bonds, B*;t-1 foreign-currency non-state-contingent bonds, and a stock of capital, kt. In period t, 
the household pays a lump-sum tax, Tt, to the government and receives dividends, Dt, from 
monopolistic firms. It also receives total factor payments of Wtht+Qtkt from selling labor and 
renting capital to domestic intermediate-good producers, where Wt and Qt denote the nominal 
wage  and  rental  rates,  respectively.  The  household’s  income  in  period  t  is  allocated  to 
consumption,  investment,  money  holdings,  and  the  purchase  of  nominal  bonds.  Acquiring 
foreign bonds entails paying (nominal) portfolio-adjustment costs:
‡   
 





















where yb is a positive parameter and et is the nominal exchange rate defined as the number of 
units  of  domestic  currency  needed  to  purchase  one  unit  of  foreign  currency.  Investment,  it, 
increases the household’s stock of capital according to  
 
  kt+1=(1-d)kt+it,   (3) 
 



















     11 













































                                                                                                                                                       (4) 





t t D D D + = ,  with 
d
t D   being  dividends  received  from  domestic  intermediate-good 
producers and 
m
t D  those received from importers of foreign intermediate goods, Rt denotes the 
gross domestic nominal interest rate, and 
*
t R  denotes the gross world nominal interest rate. 
The representative household chooses
* , , , , t t t t t B B M h c , and kt+1 to maximize its lifetime utility 
subject to its budget constraint (4), the capital accumulation equation (3), and a no-ponzi-game 
condition on its holdings of assets. The household’s first-order conditions are  
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‡Without portoflio-adjustment costs, the model would have a unit root because the bond holdings process 
would follow a random walk.   12 
 
   
where lt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint expressed in real terms; 
wtºWt/Pt is the real wage; qtºQt/Pt is the real rental rate; and ptºPt/Pt-1 is the gross inflation rate 
between t-1 and t. 
 
3.3 Production 
3.3.1 Final good 
Firms  in  the  final-good  sector  are  perfectly  competitive.  They  combine  oil  and  a  non-oil 
composite good to produce a single homogenous good using the following constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) technology:  
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Where f>0 is the weight of oil in the production of the final good and n>0 is the elasticity of 
substitution between oil and non-oil inputs. Oil is either imported or produced locally, depending 
on whether the country is a net importer or a net exporter of oil. In both cases, it is assumed that 
the  oil  sector  is  managed  by  the  government.  In  oil-importing  countries,  the  government 
practices  LCP,  buying  oil  at  the  world  price,
* o
t P ,  and  reselling  it  to  domestic  firms  at  the 
domestic price 
o
t P . In oil-exporting countries, it is assumed that the oil industry is owned by the 
government, which sells oil to the rest of the world at the world price, 
* o
t P , and to domestic firms 
at the domestic price, 
o
t P . The dollar-price of oil, 
* o
t P , is exogenous to the small open economy 
and follows the stochastic process  
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The zero-profit condition implies that the price of the final good, Pt, is given by  
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3.3.2  Non-oil composite good 
 
The  non-oil  composite  good  is  produced  by  perfectly  competitive  firms  using  the  following 
Cobb-Douglas technology: 
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t   are  aggregates  of  domestic  and  imported  intermediate  goods,   14 
respectively; and q (J)>1 is the elasticity of substitution between domestic (foreign) intermediate 






























t   as  the  price  indexes 
associated  with  the  aggregators 
d
t y   and 
m
t y .  Then,  demands  for  individual  domestic  and 
imported intermediate goods are, respectively, given by  
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3.3.3 Domestic intermediate goods 
Domestic intermediate-good producers have identical Cobb-Douglas production functions given 
by  
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
a a - = + º




t t   (23) 
 
Where  ( ) ( ) i kt ; 1 , 0 Î a   and  ( ) i ht   are  capital  and  labour  inputs  used  by  firm  i;  and  At  is  an 
aggregate technology shock. 
 
Domestic intermediate-good producers are monopolistically competitive, and are thus price 
setters. They segment markets by setting different prices for different destinations. That is, firm i 
chooses a domestic-currency price  ( ) i P
d
t  for its sales in the domestic market and a foreign-
currency price  ( ) i P
x
t  for its exports. Changing prices entails quadratic adjustment costs à la 
Rotemberg (1982):  
 





















   






t P P 1 / - º p  . Firm i solves the following 
dynamic problem:  
 
 

























t t t l
l
b   (24) 
where  
   16 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) i y i P e
i P
i P
i y i P
i P
i P




















































It is assumed that the world demand for the domestic intermediate good i is analogous to the 
domestic demand for that good. That is,  
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t , and 
x
t y  is an aggregate of exported intermediate goods that 
represents a fraction U of world demand  
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In this equation, the parameter V is the price-elasticity of world demand for domestic output; 
*
t P is the world price; and 
*
t y  is the overall world output, which is assumed to be exogenous. 
Given the demand functions (18) and (25), the first-order conditions for firm i are  
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q   (30)                           17 
 
where xt(i)  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with equation (23) and is equal to the real 
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t - º p  and 
*
1
* * / - º t t P P p  is the gross inflation rate in the rest of the world, which 
is normalized to 1. 
3.3.4  Imported intermediate goods 
 
Foreign intermediate  goods are imported by monopolistically  competitive firms at the world 
price,  
*
t P . Importing firms then sell those goods in domestic currency to final-good producers. 
Resale prices,   ( ) i P
m
t are also subject to quadratic adjustment costs:  
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The first-order condition for this problem is  
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t 1 / - º p  
3.4 The government 
It is assumed that the government sets the domestic price of oil according to the following rule: 
 






t c c + - = -  
 
Thus, if c=1, there is complete pass-through from the world price of oil to the domestic price. If 
c=0, there is zero pass-through. 
 
The government’s revenues include receipts from selling oil to domestic firms and to the rest 
of the world (if the country is a net oil exporter), overseas development assistance (ODA) funds, 
taxes and seigniorage revenues.
§  The government’s expenditures include the cost of acquiring 
oil (if the country is a net oil importer) and interest payments on outstanding public debt. Hence, 
the government’s budget constraint is given by  
 
  , ODA e ) M M ( T G B R B t t 1 t t t t 1 t 1 t t - - - - + = - - -   (34) 
where  
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if the country is a net oil importer, and 
 
  Gt=-(etPo*;tyox;t+Po;tyo;t)  
 
if the country is a net oil exporter. In the above equation, the world demand for domestic oil, 
yox;t, is assumed to be given by 
   19 





















where t is the elasticity of world demand for oil. 
 
Equation  (3)  implies  that  public  expenditures  can  be  financed  by  (i)  taxes,  (ii)  seignoriage 
revenues, (iii) ODA, and (iv) issuing new public debt. Note that this equation can be rewritten in 
the following form: 
 
  , ODA e ) M M ( T G B ) 1 R ( B B FD t t 1 t t t t 1 t 1 t 1 t t - - - - + - = - º - - - -   (35) 
 
where FD denotes the fiscal deficit. This equation implies that the fiscal deficit can be reduced 
by (i) lowering public expenditures, (ii) raising taxes, (iii) increasing seignoriage revenues, and 
(iv) higher ODA. The remaining financial needs are met by issuing new public debt. 
 
In  what  follows,  it  is  assumed,  as  in  Galí,  López-Salido,  and  Vallés  (2006),  that  the 
government follows a fiscal rule given by 
 
  ( ) ( ), G G B B ) T T ( t g 1 t b t - + - = - - j j  
 
where  jb  and  jg  are  positive  parameters.  Depending  on  the  values  of  jb  and  jg,  this  rule 
accomodates  any  mixture  of  means  (taxes,  debt,  ODA)  of  financing  public  expenditures  or 
reducing or the budget deficit. For values of jb and jg that are sufficiently close to zero, an 
increase  in  outstanding  public  debt  or  in  current  government  expenditures  does  lead  to  a 
significant change in taxes. In such a case, an ODA necessarily reduces the fiscal deficit. On the 
other hand, choosing a  high value of  jg implies that the bulk of a given increase in public 
spending is largely financed by raising taxes. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
§ODA is assumed to follow an exogenous first-order autoregressive process with an autocorrelation 
coefficient roda.   20 
3.5  Monetary authority 
 
It is assumed that the central bank manages the short-term nominal interest rate according to the 
following Taylor-type policy rule: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) e e y y R R R R t e t t y t R t R t / log / log / log / log 1 / log / log 1 r m m r r p p r r r m p + + + - + = -         
(36) 
 
where t m  is the gross rate of money growth and  0 ³ R r is the interest-rate-smoothing coefficient. 
This rule encompasses several monetary-policy/exchange-rate regimes. In particular: 
 
•  if 0 = = = e y r r rp , a pure monetary-aggregate targeting regime is obtained 
•  if 0 = = = e y r r r m , a pure inflation targeting regime is obtained (South Africa) 
•  if  0 = = = m p r r r y , a pegged exchange rate regime is obtained (Benin, Mali, ...) 
•  if  0 = = y r rp , a managed-floating regime is obtained (Ghana, Mauritius, Tunisia, ..)  
 
3.6  Symmetric equilibrium 
 
In a symmetric equilibrium, all intermediate-good producers make identical decisions. That is, 
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satisfying the private agent’s first-order conditions, the government fiscal rule, the monetary policy 
rule,  market-clearing  conditions,  and  a  balance  of  payments  equation  (the  full  set  of    equations  are 
available upon request). The variables gt and 
*
t b denote Gt/Pt and 
* * / t t P B , respectively. The model is 
solved up to a first-order approximation. To do so, the model equations are log-linearized around a   21 
deterministic steady state in which all variables are constant. This yields a system of stochastic linear 
difference equations that can be solved using the method described in Blanchard and Kahn (1980). Due to 
the complexity of the model, the Blanchard-Kahn solution cannot be found analytically. Instead, it is 
computed  numerically,  which  requires  assigning  values  to  the  model  parameters  before  starting  to 
compute the solution.  
 
4  Results 
This section discusses the impact of a doubling in the world price of oil on main macroeconomic 
variables  both  in  the  case  of  a  median  oil-importing  economy  and  a  median  oil-exporting 
economy. The variables of interest are output, consumption, inflation, the real exchange rate, the 
government budget deficit, and foreign debt. The simulations are performed both under a fixed 
exchange rate regime and a managed float. For each case, two different scenarios are considered: 
complete  and  zero  pass-through.  In  all  simulations,  the  oil-price  shock  is  assumed  to  be 
persistent, with a first-order autocorrelation coefficient of 0.85, as estimated from the data. This 
assumption is consistent with the view that the expected durability of the high oil demand from 
East Asia (especially China) is sustaining the market expectations that oil prices will remain high 
(see  for  example  ‘High  Oil  Prices  and  the  African  Economy’  presented  at  the  AfDB  2006 
Annual Meetings). 
4.1  Median Oil-Importing Economy 
 
This economy is calibrated such that oil imports represent roughly 13% of total imports and 5% 
of total GDP in the steady state. Simulation results for this case are shown in Tables 1 and 2. The 
main conclusions are the following: 
•  Under fixed exchange rates and complete pass-through, a doubling in the world price of oil 
leads  to  a  decline  in  output  and  consumption,  a  slight  increase  in  inflation,  a  small 
appreciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate,  and  moderate  changes  in  public  and  foreign 
borrowing. The output loss is about 6 percent during the first year, while the cumulative 
loss is around 23.5 percent during the five years following the shock. For consumption, the 
corresponding numbers are 4.5 and 19 percent, approximately.    22 
•  The drop in output and consumption is attributed to a combination of two effects of high 
oil prices: a direct income effect, through the resource constraint, and a direct effect on 
production,  through  higher  costs  of  inputs.  The  former  decreases  consumption  and 
increases labor supply. The latter decreases demand for non-oil inputs and, by extension, 
demand for labor and capital. The net effect on hours worked is ambiguous, but labor 
income and investment unambiguously fall (due to lower marginal productivity of labor 
and capital). The resulting reduction in households’ disposable income further decreases 
consumption and output. 
 
Table 1. Effects of a 100% increase in the price of oil 
(Net-Oil Importing Country, Fixed Exchange Rate Regime) 
Impact effect Cumulative effect
(1 year) (5 years)
Output
   Complete pass-through -6% -24%
   Zero pass-through -1% -5%
Consumption
   Complete pass-through -5% -19%
   Zero pass-through -6% -25%
Investment
   Complete pass-through -11% -39%
   Zero pass-through -7% -25%
Inflation
   Complete pass-through 2% 1%
   Zero pass-through -4% -4%
Real exchange rate
   Complete pass-through -2% -7%
   Zero pass-through 4% 22%
Budget deficit 
   Complete pass-through 4% 7%
   Zero pass-through 31% 45%
Foreign debt
   Complete pass-through -1% 2%
   Zero pass-through 9% 11%  
                             Note: Budget deficit in percentage of steady-state output. 
 
•  The  increase  in  inflation  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  domestic  price  of  oil  enters  the 
aggregate  price  index,  and  since  there  is  complete  pass-through,  oil-price  inflation 
contributes to core inflation. The higher inflation explains the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate (since the nominal exchange rate is fixed).   23 
•  Under zero pass-through, the increase in the price of oil still leads to a decline in output 
and consumption, but the magnitude of the effects differs significantly compared with the 
complete  pass-through  case.  The  decline  in  output  during  the  first  year  is  less  than  1 
percent and the cumulative loss during the five years following the shock is roughly 5 
percent. Hence, by practicing LCP, the government shields the production sector of the 
economy, which minimizes the output loss. The cost of this intervention, however, is a 
dramatic deterioration of the budget deficit (31 percent during the first year and 45 percent 
after five years), and most importantly, a large decline in consumption, which drops by 
more than 6 percent during the first year and 25 percent after five years. 
•  Under  zero  pass-through,  there  is  a  decrease  in  inflation,  which  translates  into  a  real 
exchange rate depreciation of roughly 4.3 percent in the first year and 22 percent after five 
years. 
Table 2. Effects of a 100% increase in the price of oil 
(Net-Oil Importing Country, Managed Floating) 
Impact effect Cumulative effect
(1 year) (5 years)
Output
   Complete pass-through -6% -23%
   Zero pass-through 2% -1%
Consumption
   Complete pass-through -4% -18%
   Zero pass-through -5% -25%
Investment
   Complete pass-through -10% -38%
   Zero pass-through -1% -21%
Inflation
   Complete pass-through 5% 4%
   Zero pass-through 4% 5%
Real exchange rate
   Complete pass-through -1% -5%
   Zero pass-through 9% 30%
Budget deficit 
   Complete pass-through 0% -1%
   Zero pass-through 6% 20%
Foreign debt
   Complete pass-through 1% 2%
   Zero pass-through 16% 12%  
                             Note: Budget deficit in percentage of steady-state output. 
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•  Under managed floating, the nominal exchange rate is, to a certain extent, free to adjust, 
thereby acting as a shock absorber. In principle, therefore, the adverse effects of high oil 
prices should be less severe compared to the case with fixed exchange rates. A comparison 
of Tables 1 and 2 confirms this intuition. Under complete pass-through, however, there are 
only minor differences in the response of output, consumption, inflation, and, to a lesser 
extent, foreign debt across the two regimes.
**  The gain from letting the nominal exchange 
rate float is much more apparent under zero pass-through. For example, output initially 
increases by almost 2 percent (as opposed to a decline of 1 percent) following the rise in 
the  price  of  oil,  and  the  cumulative  loss  after  five  years  is  barely  over  1  percent  (as 
opposed to a loss of 5 percent). This smaller output loss is due to the larger depreciation of 
the real exchange rate relative to the case with pegged nominal exchange rates.  
4.2  Median Oil-Exporting Economy 
 
This economy is calibrated such that oil exports represent roughly 88% of total exports and 35% 
of total GDP in the steady state. Simulation results for this case are shown in Tables 3 and 4. The 
main conclusions are the following: 
Table 3: Effects of a 100% increase in the price of oil 
(Net-Oil Exporting Country, Fixed Exchange Rate Regime) 
                                                       
**The only notable difference across the two regimes is the response of the budget deficit, which deteriorates under the peg one, 
but slightly improves under managed floating.   25 
Impact effect Cumulative effect
(1 year) (5 years)
Output
   Complete pass-through 9% 53%
   Zero pass-through 10% 56%
Consumption
   Complete pass-through 42% 152%
   Zero pass-through 41% 149%
Investment
   Complete pass-through 16% 62%
   Zero pass-through 16% 62%
Inflation
   Complete pass-through 9% 15%
   Zero pass-through 6% 14%
Real exchange rate
   Complete pass-through -9% -71%
   Zero pass-through -7% -63%
Budget deficit 
   Complete pass-through -114% -147%
   Zero pass-through -108% -139%
Foreign debt
   Complete pass-through -33% -47%
   Zero pass-through -30% -45%  
                             Note: Budget deficit in percentage of steady-state output. 
 
•  Under fixed exchange rates and complete pass-through, a doubling in the world price of oil 
leads to a 9 percent increase in output, a 42 percent increase in consumption, a 9 percent 
increase in inflation, a 9 percent real appreciation, a 114 percent reduction in the budget 
deficit, and a 33 percent reduction in foreign debt during the first year. The magnitudes of 
the  cumulative  effects  after  five  years  indicate  that  the  adjustment  of  output,  the  real 
exchange rate, and foreign debt is non monotonic. For example, the model predicts that the 
response of output to the 100 percent increase in the price of oil is hump-shaped, attaining 
its peak of 16 percent during the third year after the shock. 
•  The  increase  in  the  price  of  oil  generates  a  positive  income  effect,  via  the  resource 
constraint, which increases consumption. This rise in consumption translates into higher 
demand for the final good, which more than offsets the negative effect of the higher price 
of  oil.  As  a  result,  the  demand  for  oil  and  non-oil  inputs  increases  (due  to  their 
complementarity), thereby raising the demand for labor and capital. The resulting increase 
in  labor  demand  and  investment  further  boosts  the  demand  for  the  final  good  and, 
therefore, output.   26 
 
•  Under zero pass-through, there is a slightly larger increase in output, a lower inflation, and 
a smaller appreciation of the real exchange rate compared to the case with complete pass-
through. This “gain”, however, comes at the expense of a (marginally) smaller increase in 
consumption and a smaller improvement in the budget deficit.   27 
Table 4.  Effects of a 100% increase in the price of oil 
(Exporting country, managed floating) 
Impact effect Cumulative effect
(1 year) (5 years)
Output
   Complete pass-through 4% 25%
   Zero pass-through 4% 27%
Consumption
   Complete pass-through 16% 75%
   Zero pass-through 16% 76%
Investment
   Complete pass-through 3% 22%
   Zero pass-through 4% 23%
Inflation
   Complete pass-through -13% -12%
   Zero pass-through -14% -13%
Real exchange rate
   Complete pass-through -38% -136%
   Zero pass-through -36% -130%
Budget deficit 
   Complete pass-through -7% -24%
   Zero pass-through -6% -23%
Foreign debt
   Complete pass-through -55% -39%
   Zero pass-through -53% -38%  
                             Note: Budget deficit in percentage of steady-state output. 
 
•  Under managed floating, the output and consumption gains induced by the increase in the 
price of oil are smaller than under fixed exchange rates. This result is mainly due to the 
larger appreciation of the real exchange rate under the former regime. The smaller increase 
in consumption implies that the budget deficit narrows less than under fixed exchange 
rates. 
•  Under managed floating, the effects of an increase in the price of oil under complete and 
zero pass-through are strikingly similar.  
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5.  Policy Implications 
5.1 Government intervention 
The above analysis suggests that LCP can cushion the economy from the adverse effects of oil-
price shocks in oil-importing countries. This policy, however, amplifies the consumption loss 
and aggravates the government’s budget deficit. Hence, the answer to the question of whether a 
government should intervene or not depends on its implicit objective function. To the extent that 
the government is concerned with stabilizing output, choosing LCP proves to be the optimal 
policy. Alternatively, if the government is a benevolent social planner, then laisser-faire is likely 
to be the welfare-maximizing policy. For oil-exporting countries, government intervention does 
not seem to affect in a substantive way the outcome of the economy, especially in the case of a 
managed  floating.  This  observation  implies  that  both  intervention  and  laisser-faire  could  be 
acceptable policy choices in those countries. 
5.2.  Foreign aid 
Can foreign aid help African oil-importing countries cope with high oil prices?  Are the required 
amounts prohibitive?  Table 5 shows the permanent level of overseas development assistance (in 
percentage of steady-state output) that is required to completely offset the initial output loss 
associated with a persistent 100 percent increase in the price of oil. The table shows that the 
largest amount of foreign aid needed is less than 2 percent of steady-state output. This amount is 
clearly non-prohibitive (foreign aid in a number of African countries represents more than 5 
percent of GDP), implying that there is scope for international-community actions to help debt-
burdened African economies mitigate the adverse effects of high oil prices. 
Table 5. ODA to offset Output Loss in the First Year 
(% of Steady-State Output) 
Fixed exchange rate regime Managed Floating
Complete pass-through 1.60% 1.98%
Zero pass-through 0.23% –  
Note: ODA: Overseas Development Assistance.  
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5  Conclusion  
 
High oil prices can have very harmful effects on African oil-importing countries, especially those 
with a high debt-burden and those which have limited access to international capital markets. 
They lead to a decrease in output and consumption, and to a worsening of the net foreign asset 
position. For the median oil-importing country, the five-year cumulative output loss resulting 
from a doubling in the price of oil can be as large as 23 percent under a fixed exchange rate 
regime.  This  recessionary  effect,  however,  can  be  substantially  mitigated  through  LCP  or 
through foreign aid. In this regard, the model can be used to determine the optimal degree of 
intervention by the government given its objective function. 
 
For the median oil-exporting country, the five-year cumulative increase in output associated with 
a doubling in the price of oil exceeds 70 percent, regardless of the exchange rate regime under 
which the country operates. This manna, however, is accompanied by a sharp appreciation of the 
real  exchange  rate,  which  may  hinder  the  competitiveness  of  the  country.  It  is  therefore 
important  that  oil-export  revenues  be  spent  in  a  way  that  favors  future  growth,  and  not  in 
wasteful or badly planned projects. 
 
It should be emphasized, however, that while the analysis above focuses on “median” countries, 
there  is  a  great  deal  of  heterogeneity  within  the  groups  of  oil-importing  countries  and  oil-
exporting countries. This means that the effects of oil-price shocks can differ dramatically from 
one country to the other. As stated above, however, the proposed model can be configured to 
represent any of these countries. 
 
An important question that the model does not address is the effect of high oil prices on poverty, 
which is a crucial dimension of the African context. The model could be extended to capture this 
feature by allowing for heterogeneity across households and by assuming that some of them have 
liquidity constraints. The model can also be extended to include other types of shocks, such as 
productivity shocks, monetary-policy shocks, and world-interest-rate shocks. This would allow 
the model to answer a broader set of questions of relevance to policy makers.   30 
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7.  Appendix  
Figure 1: Structure of the production sector 
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7.2  Simulation Results 
Oil-Importing Countries: Some Country Specific Results 
Burkina Faso
Impact effect Cumulative effect
(1 year) (5 years)
Output
   Complete pass-through -4% -15%
   Zero pass-through -1% -3%
Consumption
   Complete pass-through -3% -12%
   Zero pass-through -4% -15%
Investment
   Complete pass-through -7% -25%
   Zero pass-through -4% -14%
Inflation
   Complete pass-through -1% -1%
   Zero pass-through -5% -4%
Real exchange rate
   Complete pass-through 1% 7%
   Zero pass-through 5% 25%
Budget deficit*
   Complete pass-through 9% 11%
   Zero pass-through 24% 34%
Foreign debt
   Complete pass-through 2% 4%
   Zero pass-through 8% 10%    34 
Ghana
Impact effect Cumulative effect
(1 year) (5 years)
Output
   Complete pass-through -7% -29%
   Zero pass-through 2% -4%
Consumption
   Complete pass-through -5% -35%
   Zero pass-through -7% -25%
Investment
   Complete pass-through -13% -49%
   Zero pass-through -7% -25%
Inflation
   Complete pass-through 7% 5%
   Zero pass-through 7% 7%
Real exchange rate
   Complete pass-through -5% -18%
   Zero pass-through 9% 24%
Budget deficit*
   Complete pass-through -1% -3%
   Zero pass-through 8% 27%
Foreign debt
   Complete pass-through -3% -1%
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Kenya 
Impact effect Cumulative effect
(1 year) (5 years)
Output
   Complete pass-through -12% -49%
   Zero pass-through 6% 4%
Consumption
   Complete pass-through -9% -39%
   Zero pass-through -11% -56%
Investment
   Complete pass-through -21% -81%
   Zero pass-through -1% -41%
Inflation
   Complete pass-through 10% 9%
   Zero pass-through 9% 10%
Real exchange rate
   Complete pass-through -2% -7%
   Zero pass-through 23% 76%
Budget deficit*
   Complete pass-through -1% -3%
   Zero pass-through 14% 51%
Foreign debt
   Complete pass-through 3% 5%
   Zero pass-through 38% 30%  
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Madagascar 
Impact effect Cumulative effect
(1 year) (5 years)
Output
   Complete pass-through -6% -25%
   Zero pass-through 2% -2%
Consumption
   Complete pass-through -5% -20%
   Zero pass-through -6% -29%
Investment
   Complete pass-through -11% -42%
   Zero pass-through -2% -25%
Inflation
   Complete pass-through 6% 5%
   Zero pass-through 5% 6%
Real exchange rate
   Complete pass-through -3% -12%
   Zero pass-through 8% 25%
Budget deficit*
   Complete pass-through -1% -2%
   Zero pass-through 6% 22%
Foreign debt
   Complete pass-through -1% 0%
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Malawi 
Impact effect Cumulative effect
(1 year) (5 years)
Output
   Complete pass-through -4% -16%
   Zero pass-through 1% -2%
Consumption
   Complete pass-through -3% -12%
   Zero pass-through -4% -17%
Investment
   Complete pass-through -7% -26%
   Zero pass-through -1% -16%
Inflation
   Complete pass-through 4% 3%
   Zero pass-through 3% 3%
Real exchange rate
   Complete pass-through -2% -7%
   Zero pass-through 5% 15%
Budget deficit*
   Complete pass-through 0% -1%
   Zero pass-through 4% 13%
Foreign debt
   Complete pass-through -1% 0%
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Senegal 
Impact effect Cumulative effect
(1 year) (5 years)
Output
   Complete pass-through -5% -21%
   Zero pass-through -1% -5%
Consumption
   Complete pass-through -4% -16%
   Zero pass-through -6% -23%
Inflation
   Complete pass-through 3% 1%
   Zero pass-through -3% -2%
Real exchange rate
   Complete pass-through -3% -9%
   Zero pass-through 3% 16%
Budget deficit*
   Complete pass-through 2% 4%
   Zero pass-through 27% 38%
Foreign debt
   Complete pass-through -1% 1%
   Zero pass-through 7% 9%  
 
                             Note: *Budget deficit in percentage of steady-state output. 
 